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Most high and middle-income countries showed symptoms of skill-biased technological 
change in the 1980s.  India – a low income country – did not, perhaps because India's 
traditionally controlled economy may have limited the transfer of technologies from abroad.   
However the economy underwent a sharp reform and a manufacturing boom in the 1990s, raising 
the possibility that technology absorption may have accelerated during the past decade.  We 
investigate the hypothesis that skill-biased technological change did in fact arrive in India in the 
1990s using panel data disaggregated by industry and state from the Annual Survey of Industry 
(ASI).  These data confirm that while the 1980s were a period of falling skills demand, the 1990s 
showed generally rising demand for skills, with variation across states.  We find that increased 
output and capital-skill complementarity appear to be the best explanations of skill upgrading in 
the 1990s.  Skill upgrading did not occur in the same set of industries in India as it did in other 
countries, suggesting that increased demand for skills in Indian manufacturing is not due to the 
international diffusion of recent vintages of skill-biased technologies.  
 
 
JEL keywords: O300 - Technological Change; J240 - Human Capital; Skills;  O530 - Economywide Country 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Indian economy grew at unprecedented rates in the late eighties and nineties with 
manufacturing growth exceeding that of the rest of the economy. Rapid economic growth raises 
questions about what the Indian labor market will look like in the near future.  If the experience 
of developed countries over the past few decades is any guide, demand for education will 
increase substantially. Predicting this demand is important, both because of the practical need to 
guide investments by individuals and institutions and because accelerated demand for education 
not matched by a matching surge in supply will lead to increased income inequality.  
A growing consensus among labor economists is that a major factor leading to increased 
demand for education in the U.S. is the bias of technological change toward more educated labor, 
so called “skill-biased” technological change (SBTC).  Autor and Katz (1999) provide a survey of 
this literature.  Several authors have extended this conclusion to other OECD countries, including 
Katz, Loveman and Blanchflower (1995) and Berman, Bound and Machin (1998).  Berman and 
Machin (2000) provide evidence of SBTC in manufacturing industries of middle-income 
economies as well, suggesting that SBTC could be a global phenomenon. Trade liberalization 
may be associated with SBTC in developing countries. For example, Pavcnik (2002) and 
Attanasio et al (2004) provide some evidence that imported technology adoption and trade are 
related to skill upgrading in Chile and Columbia respectively.
3 
Motivated by evidence of skill-biased technological change (SBTC) in middle income and 
OECD countries in the 1980s, we look for SBTC in Indian manufacturing in the 1980s and 
1990s.  In the Berman and Machin (2000) sample it appeared to be conspicuously absent in the 
1980s in India.  Yet, India's traditionally controlled economy underwent a sharp reform in 1991, 
suggesting the possibility that technology absorption may have accelerated during the past   3
decade.  We investigate the hypothesis that skill-biased technological change did in fact arrive in 
India in the 1990s, examining Indian registered manufacturing using the Annual Survey of 
Industry (ASI).  We look for symptoms familiar from the manufacturing sectors of other 
industrialized and developing countries.  
We use the ASI for 1984-1998, aggregated by 3 digit industry for each of the twenty one 
Indian states and union territories. Our analysis of these data show that the mid- to late 1980s 
were indeed a period of falling demand for skilled labor in manufacturing, as reported in the 
cruder data used in Berman-Machin (2000).  This is true to a varying degree in most Indian 
States. However, following major economic reforms in the late eighties and early nineties, the 
demand for skilled labor in manufacturing increased throughout the subsequent period, fairly 
consistently over time, though not consistently across states.  
The pattern of changes in the demand for skill in Indian manufacturing is different from 
that observed for other countries in two important respects. First, though we do find some 
evidence of increased capital-skill complementarity, the best predictor of skill-upgrading is 
increased output. Second, previous studies find skill upgrading in manufacturing tends to be 
concentrated in the same industries across countries. Indian manufacturing did not undergo 
disproportional skill upgrading in those typical industries, indicating an increased demand for 
skill in manufacturing qualitatively different from that experienced by other OECD and middle-
income countries.   4
2.  THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
Indian industrial policies were put in place just after independence in the 1950s and remained 
largely unchanged until the mid-eighties. The Industries Development and Regulation Act of 
1951 and the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1948 outline these policies.  Their major objective 
was to achieve economic self-reliance through import substitution and large-scale public 
investment in heavy industry.  Investment by private firms was governed by strict licensing 
requirements to ensure that the resulting pattern of production was in line with the priorities set 
out in the Five Year Plans.   
In addition, the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Policies (MRTP) Act of 1969 and the 
Foreign Exchange Regulation Act of 1973 were introduced to limit foreign equity in Indian 
industry and discourage market concentration.  Statements of changes in industrial policy were 
made in 1973, 1977 and 1980 which involved some streamlining of the licensing process and 
additional advantages for small and medium sized firms, especially those which exported most of 
their production.  No significant liberalization measures were taken before the mid-1980s.
4  Most 
firms required licenses for any capacity expansion or changes in their product mix. Foreign equity 
was severely restricted. Foreign exchange restrictions, import quotas and tariffs on both consumer 
and capital goods were used to encourage the growth of indigenous heavy industry.  
In 1985 the regulatory framework started to change considerably.  Clearances required for 
capacity expansion were reduced and industrial categories were broadened so that firms would 
not need approval for small changes in their product mix.
5  Each successive year shortened the 
list of industries requiring licenses. These changes were accompanied by a significant 
acceleration in the growth of manufacturing, which, for the first time since Independence, 
averaged over 6 per cent in the second half of the 1980s and almost 7 per cent between 1992 and   5
1997. Table 1 illustrates the acceleration of manufacturing growth and GDP growth in general in 
India since the early 1980s. 
Table 1: Historical Sectoral Growth Rates in India 
 
PLAN Agriculture  Manufacturing  GNP 
   FIRST (1951-56)  2.5  5.0  3.7 
   SECOND (1956-61)  2.2  4.5  4.2 
   THIRD (1961-66)  -.30  5.3  2.8 
   Three Annual Plans (1966-69)  4.5  2.7  3.9 
   FOURTH (1969-74)  1.3  1.8  3.4 
   FIFTH (1974-79)  3.6  5.9  5.0 
   SIXTH (1980-85)  3.1  4.9  5.4 
   SEVENTH (1985-90)  3.1  6.2  5.9 
   EIGHTH (1992-97)  3.4  6.9  6.8 
      
Source: Government of India, Economic Survey, 2000-2001, Tables S-4 and S-5. 
Notes: GDP is estimated to be 27% industry, 25% agriculture for 2000. 
           (World Bank India Data Profile: www.worldbank.org/data)   
    
In 1991, a new industrial policy ushered in a period of truly dramatic reforms. The 
number of industries reserved for the public sector was halved.
6 Licensing was abolished in all 
but a small group of industries. Perhaps more importantly from our perspective, there were 
complementary changes in policies relating to trade and financial markets. Foreign investment 
was encouraged, quantitative import restrictions were largely abandoned and tariffs were 
significantly reduced.  A phased reduction in import tariffs has been undertaken since.  The peak 
tariff rate was reduced from over 300 to 110 percent in 1992, 85 percent in 1993, 65 percent in 
1994, 50 percent in 1995 and 25 percent in 2003.
7  
It seems plausible that these regulatory reforms, taken together, made it much easier for 
firms to adopt imported technologies.  We also might expect that changes in the pattern of skill 
demand experienced by developed countries adopting these technologies would be repeated in 
India in the liberalized environment of the 1990s.  The ASI does display a clear pattern of skill   6
upgrading in the 1990s.  Figure 1 shows that during the 1990s the proportion of non-manual
8 
workers in registered manufacturing increased (from 23.5 to 24.4 percent) despite the increase in 
their relative wages (from 1.88 to 2.04).
9  This is in contrast to the period of declining relative 
wages of non-manual workers between 1985 and 1991.  Not shown is the pattern of employment 
growth in registered manufacturing, which had been increasing steadily and accelerated after 
1991. Since both the relative wage and the proportion of non-manual workers increased in the 
1990s, it follows that the increased quantities of non-manual workers employed represent an 
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Figure 1: Relative Wages of Non-manual (Skilled) Workers 
and their Proportion in Employment - 1984-98 
 
During the 1985-90 period, it is hard to make a clear statement about whether demand or 
supply for skills dominates.  Since wages and quantities change in opposite directions one cannot 
tell if shifts in demand dominate movements along a demand curve (for manual relative to non-  7
manual workers) in response to changes in relative wages.  One way to approach that problem is 
to see what the diagnosis would be with an assumed aggregate elasticity of substitution.  If that 
elasticity were unity, then the wage-bill share of non-manual workers would not be changed by 
supply, as changes in relative wage (in isolation) would exactly be compensated by changes in 
proportion employed, leaving the wage-bill constant.  Any change in wage-bill share could then 
be attributed to relative demand shifts.  As seen in Figure 2, the wage-bill share of non-manual 
workers declined by 0.12 percentage points per year in the 1985-91 period, indicating a reduction 
in demand for skills under the unitary elasticity assumption.  In contrast, the wage-bill share of 
non-manual (i.e. skilled) workers increased in the 1990s, indicating an acceleration in demand for 
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    Table 2: Within/Between Decompositions in High, Middle and Low Income Countries 
  1970-80 1980-90   
 % ΔSn %  Within %ΔSn %  Within  Notes 
HIGH INCOME GROUP      
US  0.19 86 0.51 76   
Australia  0.06 52 0.42 92  1970,  80  ,87 
Sweden  0.38 81 0.07 25   
Norway  0.33  76      1970, 80, na 
West Germany  0.67  95  0.42  83  1970, 79, 90 
Luxembourg  0.90  95  0.73        123   
Denmark  0.12 42 0.64 89  1973,  80,  89 
Belgium  0.77  86        -0.06  92  1973, 80, 85 
Finland  0.27 82 0.70 83   
Austria  0.69 93 0.36 76  1970,  81,  90 
UK  0.39 91 0.62 92   
Japan  0.37 98 0.14 98  1969-75,  78-90 
MIDDLE INCOME GROUP      
Venezuela  0.78 141 0.56  62  1970,  81,  91 
Spain      0.70  92  na, 80, 90 
Ireland  0.02 25 0.58 75  1970,  80,  89 
Greece  0.38        104  0.93  90   
Cyprus            -0.07         108  na, 81, 91 
Uruguay      0.17  51  na, 80, 88 
Hungary      0.93  96  na, 80, 90 
Portugal  -0.97  96  0.48  90  1972, 80, 87 
Malta  -0.26  43  0.72  76  1970, 80, 88 
Poland      0.06  80  1970, 80, 89 
Chile 1.12  92  0.05  153   
Czechoslovakia  0.06 61 0.22 92  1970,  80,  89 
Malaysia      -0.35  86  na, 83, 90 
Korea      0.08  36  1973, 80, 90 
Colombia        -0.13  145  0.66  84  1972, 80, 90 
Peru  0.13        -247  1.38         103  1972, 80, 88 
Turkey      0.60  79  na, 83, 90 
Guatemala  0.36 50 0.96 69  1973,  80,  87 
LOW INCOME GROUP      
Philippines  0.68  46      1970, 77, na 
Egypt  0.23 49 0.44 83  1971,  80,  88 
Pakistan      0.50  72  na, 80, 88 
Bangladesh  0.21 152 0.32  20  1970,  80,  88 
India  0.19   -11        -0.08         303  1970, 80, 88 
Tanzania       -0.43   93  0.65  84  1970, 80, 85 
Ethiopia      0.58  91  na, 80, 88 
 Note: ΔSn is the change in non-manual wage-bill share×100. The percentage “within” is the percentage of 
  the change due to within industry increases. Data are from the United Nations General Industrial Statistics 
  program. See Berman and Machin (2000) and Berman, Bound and Machin (1998) for data definitions and 
  detailed descriptions of the data.  9
  
  Now consider these changes in an international and historical context. Table 2 reproduces 
descriptive data on skill-upgrading in manufacturing industries of 37 countries in the 1970s and 
1980s.  Consider the share of non-production (or non-manual) workers in total wage-bill as a 
measure of skill use in manufacturing. The table can be summarized as follows:  In a typical high 
income country the non-manual wage-bill share in manufacturing increased by 3-4 percentage 
points over the 1970s and by about 4 percentage points in the 1980s.  In a typical middle income 
country the non-manual wage-bill share in manufacturing was stagnant in the 1970s and 
increased by 4-5 percentage points in the 1980s.  It is hard to speak of a typical low income 
country since India dwarfs the other six countries in that sample.  India’s non-manual wage-bill 
share increased by 0.19 percentage points in the 1970s but declined by 0.08 percentage points in 
the 1980s.  This decline was exceptional in the international context. Only three other countries 
in the sample of 37 experienced such a decline, and none of those were low income countries.   
Our goal is to investigate the causes of that increase in demand for skills in Indian 
manufacturing in the 1990s. The next section describes a framework for estimation and derives an 
estimating equation.  We then present results.   10
3. SKILL–BIASED TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE – A FRAMEWORK 
The first aspect of our framework is a definition of factor-biased technological change.
10 
Consider a production technology 
 Y = g (K, S, L, t) ,                   (1) 
where K is capital, S is skilled labor, L is unskilled labor and t is time. Now define the bias of 
technological change as the rate at which the elasticity of output with respect to any factor 

















In this context, technological change is absolutely skill-biased if γs>0. Absolute skill-bias implies 
increased demand for skills because their marginal product is increasing. Conversely, 
technological change is absolutely labor-saving if γl<0, which implies decreased demand for 
unskilled labor. The literature has defined skill-bias as a relative shift in demand from unskilled 
to skilled workers, a definition which does not require an absolute decline in demand for 
unskilled workers.
11 
The skill-biased technological change (SBTC) hypothesis argues that employers’ 
increased demand for skilled workers has been largely driven by the kinds of new technologies 
that are permeating modern workplaces.  The critical idea is that these new technologies lead not 
only to higher productivity, but also favor more educated workers. As such, employers increase 
demand for more skilled (i.e., more educated) workers
12 who complement the new technology.  
At the same time, workers who do not possess the appropriate skills to operate the new 
technologies face decreased demand.  As such, the wages and employment of the more skilled 
rise relative to their less skilled counterparts.   11
One can illustrate simultaneously rising relative wages and employment for the skilled 
workers in terms of a simple relative demand and supply framework, making the standard 
assumption that factors are paid their marginal products. 
 
 
Figure 3 shows a labor market with two skill types, skilled and unskilled (viz non-manual 
and manual workers), where employers demand a certain number of each.  Equilibrium in the 
model is given by the intersection of the relative demand and supply curves given by D0 and S0 in 
the Figure, with a relative wage of (Ws/WL)0 and relative employment of (S/L)0.  
The experience of many countries in recent years is that the ratio of skilled to unskilled 
wages has increased or remained steady while the ratio of skilled to unskilled employment has 
risen (Berman, Bound and Machin, 1998).  To get such an outcome, there has to have been an 
outward shift in the relative demand curve.  Suppose the demand curve shifts out to D1.  One then 
ends up with simultaneously higher relative wages and employment for the skilled at (Ws/WL)1 
and (S/L)1.  Much of the literature has argued that the key driver of the observed relative demand 
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Figure 3: Supply and Demand for Skills   12
ranges from direct measures of technology to correlated changes across countries (see Berman 
and Machin (2000) for details and a summary). 
The SBTC hypothesis requires that technology drives shifts in skill demand.  Because of 
this one should see skill-use shifts occurring where employers have more to gain from the 
introduction of new technology. Consequently there should be systematic differences in the 
extent of relative demand shifts within particular workplaces, firms and industries, each of whom 
is likely to differ in their demand for and the extent of their use of new technologies.  One test of 
relevance to the SBTC argument therefore comes from a decomposition of aggregate changes in 
skills demand (usually measured by wage bill or employment shares of skilled workers), say ΔSn, 
for i =1,…N industries as follows: 











i i i Sn ΔP P ΔSn ΔSn                                                    (2) 
The decomposition breaks the overall shift in skill demand into two components. The first is the 
within-industry component of skill upgrading (weighted by P, the relative size of industry i, 
where a bar is a time mean). The second measures the contribution of between-industry shifts, 
namely how much bigger or smaller an industry is becoming over time (weighted by the time 
averaged skill demand). 
A number of studies using this kind of decomposition have systematically found that the 
bulk of the aggregate changes have occurred within, rather than between industries or 
workplaces.  These studies cover different countries, levels of aggregation, time period and skill 
measures.  It is clear the bulk of the skill upgrading that has occurred in OECD manufacturing 
since the start of the 1970s has been within, rather than between, industries.
13 
Moreover, the same is true in the developing world. Table 2 reported within-between 
decompositions for high, middle and low income countries.  The within-industry component is   13
seen to be more important almost everywhere.
14  It therefore seems that across the world the 
within industry aspect of skill demand is what matters most.  Of course that could be consistent 
with other possible explanations but the fact that the bulk of the shifts are seen within industries, 
when increased relative wages of skilled workers predict within industry skill-downgrading (i.e., 
substitution away from the input with the rising relative wage) provides one form of evidence.  
This is entirely consistent with SBTC altering relative wage and employment outcomes globally.  
The evidence of the previous section is consistent with SBTC being important, but does 
not relate shifts in skills demand to observable technologies.  Indicators of technological change 
such as use of computers or R&D investments have been shown to be correlated with skill-
upgrading in the U.S. and U.K.  (see a summary in Berman and Machin, 2000). One frequently 
used formal test is to estimate cost share equations relating changes in the skilled 
wagebill/employment share in a given industry to observable measures of technology (see 
Berman, Bound and Griliches, 1994).  Define Sn as the wage-bill share of skilled workers. For 
industry i in year t, the share equation  
                              ΔSnit =  α+ βΔlog(Kit/Y) + γΔlog(Yit) + δΔlog (wS/wL )it                                            (3) 
can be derived from a translog cost function dual to the production function in (1) with two labor 
inputs (skilled and unskilled), assuming capital to be a quasi-fixed factor.  Constant returns to 
scale imply γ=0, though γ may also capture short term cyclical fluctuations likely in Sn (perhaps 
due to differential adjustment costs in hiring and releasing skilled and unskilled workers).   
Capital skill complementarity (Griliches, 1969) implies β>0.  One possible explanation 
for increased demand for skill is capital-skill complementarity combined with an increased 
capital-output ratio.  While capital-skill complementarity is important in explaining the cross-
sectional pattern of skill use in U.S. manufacturing, it turns out to be a relatively minor source of   14
skill upgrading in the past few decades (Berman, Bound and Griliches, 1994).  Nevertheless, 
changes in capital skill complementarity will reflect changes in skill-bias of technology 
embedded in capital.  We investigate both the level and change in β in estimates below. 
  The share equation approach can be expanded to allow us to test the effects of imports (I) 
and exports (X).  In an economy abundant in unskilled labor increased exports or imports will 
induce a shift towards production of goods intensive in unskilled labor.
15  To the extent that this 
shift occurs within industries (which we measure in 3 digit industry aggregates) we expect that 
the coefficients on imports and exports (φ and η) will be negative in the following equation. 
ΔSnit = α + βΔlog(K/Y)it + γΔlog(Yit) + δ Δlog (wS/wL)it  
                                         + φΔlog(I/Y)it + ηΔlog(X/Y)it                                                (4) 
In the literature this equation often includes an indicator of technological change, such as R&D, 
investment in computers or significant innovations. Those data are lacking in the ASI. 
Turning to estimation issues, the presence of the relative wage on the right hand side 
when the wage-bill share is on the left opens up the possibility of endogeneity bias or of spurious 
correlation due to measurement error in wages, which may be reflected in the wage-bill share.  
For that reason we choose to drop the relative wage term from the estimated equation and risk an 
omitted variable bias.  If labor markets clear sufficiently so that relative wages undergo the same 
changes across industries, that omitted term will be absorbed in the constant. Alternatively a 
unitary elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers implies δ=0.  We thus 
arrive at an estimating equation:  
ΔSnit = α + βΔlog(K/Y)it + γΔlog(Yit) + φΔlog(I/Y)it + ηΔlog(X/Y)it + εit           (5) 
We turn in the next section to a discussion of the data used to test the SBTC hypothesis for Indian 
manufacturing, followed by the results.   15
4. DATA AND RESULTS 
The analysis is based on the India Annual Survey of Industry (ASI) which was available to us 
from 1983/84 through 1997/98 disaggregated by state and 3 digit (NIC) industry.
16  This is a 
survey of registered manufacturing firms, reporting employment in two skill categories (non-
manual and manual workers), which we interpret as representing skilled and unskilled labor, 
respectively. The data also contain wage-bills for each labor category, output, value added, 
capital stock and a number of other variables.
17 
The public-use ASI data are of uneven quality. We discovered numerous internal and external 
inconsistencies in these data and believe that we have resolved most of them.  In keeping with the 
Griliches’ tradition of attention to measurement issues (Griliches, 1986) we discuss what we’ve 
learned here. (A separate appendix on data construction is available upon request.) We examined 
time-series of employment for sudden changes in each 3 digit industry by state, and then 
compared these figures with totals available from the Central Statistical Organization with data 
from other sources when any inconsistencies remained unexplained. We found two types of data 
problems:  
1)  Possible coding mistakes - The data indicate a very sharp decline in employment in West 
Bengal between 1984 and 1985, from 1.1 million manufacturing workers to 800 thousand.  180 
thousand of that decline is reported in one 3 digit industry, aluminum manufacturing (NIC 335)
18. 
Similar declines are reported for value added, output and other statistics.  That sharp reduction in 
employment is inconsistent with the slight but steady employment increase reported in official 
statistics by the Bureau of Economics and Statistics in the Government of West Bengal.
19 
Compared to national totals for employment, the 1984 figures from our ASI data seem to be 
about 160,000 too high, indicating that this one industry is probably the source of the entire   16
mistake.  Recognizing this, our analysis is conducted both with and without the suspect West 
Bengal data.  Happily, the focus of our analysis – the wage-bill share of non-manual workers – is 
not particularly sensitive to the treatment of West Bengal in 1984. 
2) Inconsistent aggregation - We found that at the 4 digit industry level a large number of 
industry-state observations were present in some years but missing in previous or subsequent 
years, apparently due to a policy of aggregating observations across industry classifications in 
order to preserve confidentiality.  This policy is described in ASI documentation.  Unfortunately, 
this aggregation is not performed consistently over time, so that industries seem to pop in and out 
of the data. Our solution to this problem was to deal with industries at the 3 digit level of 
aggregation in (state x industry) analysis and to restrict our attention to States in which 
employment was large enough to avoid confidentiality problems at the three digit level. Previous 
work on U.S. manufacturing has not been sensitive to this type of aggregation. 
 
Results 
Table 3 reports changes in relative wages and quantities for non-manual and manual workers for 
the pre- and post-reform sample periods, 1984-89 and 1990-98 respectively.  Recall that non-
manual workers are the higher education, or “skilled” category.  During the 1990-98 period, the 
proportion of non-manual workers in employment increased by 0.10 percentage points per year, 
while their relative wages increased by 1.07 percent annually.  In contrast, during the 1984-89 
period the employment share of non-manual workers dropped by 0.23 percentage points annually, 
while their relative wages increased at a rate of 0.26 percent per year.  
The aggregate increase in demand for non-manual workers in the 1990s is evident in the 
fact that their proportion and relative wage increased at the same time.  What accounted for this 
demand shift?   Skill-bias in technological change is one possibility, but not the only one.  A shift   17
in the composition of output due to trade, shifts in tastes or scale effects could all cause demand 
for non-manual workers to increase as skill-intensive industries increase their employment shares. 
As a first step in diagnosis we decompose changes in the proportion of skilled labor in 
employment into within- and between- industry components as outlined above. Within-industry 
shifts in the wage-bill indicate a shift in demand within industries.  Those could be due to SBTC 
or capital-skill complementarity (which we analyze below), but cannot be due to shifts in the 
industrial distribution of employment or wagebill. 
 
 
Table 3: Within Industry Changes in Employment of Skilled Labor: 
Annualized Changes 
 
  84-89 90-98 
∆ employment 















% ∆ in relative 
wage (wn/ wp)  0.26 1.07 
 
Note:  percentage “within” is the percentage of the change due to within industry  increases, 
according to the decomposition discussed in the text. The percentage change in the relative wage 
of non-manual workers is also an annual average.  
    
The key point of Table 3 is that during the 1990s these “within” industry proportions are 
positive and the dominant term in Indian manufacturing.  A full 85 percent of the increase in 
employment share and 89 percent of the increase in wage-bill share of skill occur within two digit 
industries.  That indicates industries were substituting toward the employment of skilled labor 
despite the rising relative wage of skill.  In this sense India in the 1990s reproduces the pattern   18
familiar from our other studies in the 1980s in the manufacturing sectors of the vast majority of 
countries surveyed, as reported in Table 2.  
In diagnosing changes in demand for skills, shifts in supply are a confounding factor.  One 
approach to neutralizing the effects of supply shifts is to assume an elasticity of substitution of 
unity between skilled and unskilled labor, so that the wage-bill is invariant to movement along 
the relative demand curve as in Figure 3 above.  That approach recommends the wage-bill share 
of non-manual workers as a measure of demand for skills, since it shifts only with demand under 
the assumption.  Figure 2 illustrates that approach for the ASI data.  The non-manual share of 
wage-bill drops between 1984 and 89 and then rises fairly steadily through the 1990s.  Compared 
to the two series in Figure 1, relative wages and proportion of non-manual workers in 
employment, the wage-bill share series is smoother, suggesting that indeed supply shifts are being 
muted in this series by motion along a demand curve. 
India is a country of diverse manufacturing technologies spread across vast distances with 
poor transport between States and between interior States and foreign markets.  Consequently, 
one might suspect that shifts in demand for skill would differ across States.  Table 4 investigates 
cross-state differences in demand for skills in manufacturing, reporting for each state in both 
periods the change in wage-bill shares of non-manual workers, the proportion of that change that 
occurs within industries and the change in relative wages. Note that registered manufacturing 
employment varies widely across states (as does population) from a high of 1.5 million in 
Maharashtra to just 11 thousand in Chandigarh. Six states are not reported as they have so little 
employment that reclassification across 3 digit industries (NIC) may be suspect.  
Table 4 reports three clear findings about demand for skills in the 1990s.  First, in fully 19 
of the 21 States the wage-bill share of non-manual workers increased in the post-reform sample   19
period between 1991 and 1998.  The only exception among the large states was West Bengal. 
Second, in 10 of those 14 cases the proportion of that change which occurred within industries 
was strongly positive (over 60 percent), providing a preliminary indication of SBTC.  Third, 
despite the similar sign of these changes, the size varied considerably across regions.  This last 
finding—of diversity in skill upgrading—mimics the popular perception of widely different 
growth in manufacturing across regions.  
 
Table 4: Changes in Wage-bill Shares by State and Period 
  84-89  90-98 
State
*  ∆ Sn  % within  % ∆ 





Andhra Pradesh   -0.91  125.62  -8.49  0.43       45.34  0.90  985 
Assam   0.05  55.81  0.70  -0.33  111.58  -1.43  132 
Bihar   -0.80  116.90  -2.33  0.26  143.20  -0.49  262 
Chandigarh -0.37  -25.32  -2.96  0.82  124.42  -0.20    11 
Delhi 0.33  -51.82  -2.14  0.64  116.21  1.80  128 
Goa, Daman and Diu  -0.94  69.80  -2.66  --  --  --   45 
Gujarat 0.39  -60.98  -1.72  0.89  51.34  1.80  825 
Haryana   -0.61  109.84  -5.22  0.82  67.60  1.91  277 
Himachal Paradesh  -0.90  80.16  -0.77  0.85  55.57  2.54   38 
Jammu and Kashmir  1.18  56.87  0.22    -0.02  -672.83  0.76  24 
Karnataka 0.16  -120.96  -1.60  0.52  120.53  3.61  582 
Kerala  0.18 18.22  -2.44 0.03 91.35  -3.67  360 
Madhya Paradse  0.20       -8.72  0.82  -0.11  182.23  -1.02  380 
Maharashtra   -0.43   144.10  -1.49  0.53  94.38  2.57        1,423 
Orissa   0.06  -230.79  3.76  -1.44  99.53  -4.26  142 
Punjab -0.33  139.48  5.25  0.88  96.58  2.42  332 
Pandicherry 0.89  -33.03  3.84  1.22  27.13  7.22    35 
Rajasthan 0.84  72.33  0.91  0.13  -67.10  -0.31  242 
Tamil Nadu  -0.44  78.40  -1.56  0.14  170.83  0.53       1,203 
Uttar Pradesh   0.37  -0.78  -0.59  0.30  87.35  0.25  674 
West Bengal  -0.55  83.01  15.68    -0.07  -109.40  0.86  760 
 Total  -0.23 175.31  0.26  0.37  89.45  1.07  8,900 
  Notes:   1. ∆Sn is the change in non-manual wage-bill share × 100. The percentage “within” is the percentage of 
the change due to within industry increases, according to the decomposition discussed in the text. The percentage 
change in the relative wage of non-manual workers is also an annual average. 
  2. The table omits six state groupings with less than 10,000 employed persons in manufacturing: Dadar, Nagar 
and Haveli, Tripura, A&N Islands, Meghalaya, Nagaland and Manipur.    20
 
To estimate equation (5), the share equation, we divided the ASI data into two sub-
periods, from 1984 through 1989 and from 1990 through 1998. (We exclude the 1989-90 
transition because of inconsistencies in the redefinition of industries, as noted above).   
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics - Manufacturing Industries 1984-98 
 
  Annualized Change 1984-89  Annualized Change 1990-98 
  Mean  Std. Dev  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Non-manual share 
in wage-bill  -0.0041   0.0062  0.0031  0.0036 
Log capital  0.059  0.084  0.131  0.052 
Log value added  0.043  0.074  0.104  0.045 
Log imports  0.112  0.146  0.126  0.113 
Log exports  0.139  0.144  0.115  0.092 
 
  Note: Annualized changes for 76 four-digit (ISIC) manufacturing industries for all of India in each period. 
 
  Table 5 reports summary statistics.  Recall that the 1984-89 period largely preceded 
economic reforms, and was characterized by a decreased proportion of non-manual (skilled) 
workers by 0.41 percentage points per year.  In contrast, in 1990-98 the proportion of non-manual 
workers increased by 0.31 percentage points per year.
20  Note that imports and exports also grew 
rapidly in both periods, but the 1990s stand out in the rapid growth of investment and value 
added.  For instance, capital grew by over 13.1 percent per year and value added by 10.4 percent 
so that the capital/value added ratio increased by 2.7 percent annually. 
The share equations derived demonstrate the relative importance of output growth, capital, 
imports and exports in demand for skills.  Table 6 reports the result of estimating equation (5) 
using the national data for 76 “4 digit” (ISIC)
21 industries.  The left four columns of results report 
separate estimates for each period, revealing the contrast between periods.  In 1984-89 growth in   21
the K/Y explains little of the decline in the wage-bill share of non-manual workers, with a small 
and statistically insignificant coefficient.  In contrast in 1990-98 the coefficient on growth in K/Y 
is large and statistically significant, at 0.0263.  This larger coefficient in the 1990s indicates that 
capital-skill complementarity increased between the 1980s and 1990s.  That increase in capital-
skill complementarity, coupled with the growing K/Y ratio in the 1990s, may explain some 
fraction of the increased demand for skills in manufacturing during the 1990s. 
 
Table 6: Estimated Wage-bill Share Equations - National Manufacturing 1984-98 
Estimates for 76 four digit industries at the National Level 
Dep. variable: Change in 
non-manual wagebill share  1984-89 1990-98  Pooled 1984-89 / 1990-98 
1990s indicator          0.0071  0.0067  0.0036  0.0033 
         (.0010) (.0010) (.0014) (.0016) 
d Log capital/value added  0.0022 0.0010 0.0263 0.0279    0.0007 0.0022  0.0011 
  (.0156) (.0150) (.0104) (.0103)    (.0147) (.0157)  (.0149) 
d Log capital/value added 
x 1990s         0.0157  0.0240 0.0281 
           (.0179)  (.0188) (.0184) 
d Log value added  0.0050 0.0065 0.0297 0.0317     0.0050  -0.0043 
  (.0116) (.0123) (.0100) (.0114)    (.0117)  (.0147) 
d Log value added x 1990s          0.0247 0.0254 
             (.0153) (.0165) 
d Log imports/value added    -0.0065    -0.0033      -0.0055 
   (.0067)    (.0030)      (.0045) 
d Log exports/value added    -0.0054    -0.0041      -0.0054 
   (.0088)    (.0046)      (.0065) 
Constant  -0.0043 -0.0029 -0.0007 -0.0001 -0.0041 -.0041 -.0043 -0.0030 
  (.0009) (.0015) (.0011) (.0015) (.0008) (.0008)  (.0009) (.0013) 
 R
2  0.00 0.05 0.16 0.17 0.33 0.34  0.36 0.38 
Observations  76 76 76  76 152  152  152  152 
Note: Figures are annualized changes for 76 four-digit (ISIC) manufacturing industries for all of India in each period. 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. Regressions estimated by weighted least 
squares with wage-bill shares averaged over the period as weights. Coefficients are significant at the 5% level in bold 
face. See equation (4) in text.   22
The other variables in this specification are also interesting.  The coefficient on value 
added indicates that faster growing industries also increased their wage-bill share of non-manual 
workers, in violation of the constant-returns hypothesis, which implies that input shares are 
invariant to scale.  
Imports and exports have negative coefficients in this regression, consistent with a 
Heckscher-Ohlin approach to our industry regressions, suggesting that exports and imports 
reduce skill content within industries in an unskilled labor abundant country by reallocating 
production to less skill-intensive products. (This is the opposite of increasing skill-content, which 
would be the case if India traded primarily with a less skill-abundant country or exported mainly 
goods which were skill-abundant for India.) These coefficients are small and statistically 
insignificant but nevertheless explain some reduced demand for non-manual workers, especially 
in the 1980s. 
The four rightmost columns of Table 6 examine how much of the acceleration in the 
wage-bill share of non-manual workers can be attributed to covariates, mostly output growth and 
capital-skill complementarity.  Using the pooled sample, the coefficient on the constant is the 
annualized change in the non-manual wage-bill share between 1984 and 1989, which is negative 
0.0041 in the baseline specification (as in Table 5).  The coefficient on the indicator for the 
1990s, 0.0071, reflects the acceleration in the non-manual wage-bill share from -0.0041 to 
+0.0031 (with a little rounding error).  Adding covariates as we move to the right explains about 
half that acceleration, reducing the coefficient to 0.0033 in the rightmost column.  Specifically, 
including the change in log K/Y and the change in log Y explain about half the acceleration 
between them, if those coefficients are allowed to differ between the 1980s and 1990s.  Yet, the 
specification with only the capital skill complementarity term (the 6
th column) has a coefficient   23
on the 1990s of 0.0067, indicating that the change in capital-skill complementarity alone explains 
very little of the acceleration (1 - .0067/.0071 = 6 percent). 
Table 7: Estimated Wage-bill Share Equations -State  Manufacturing  1984-98 
Pooled sample of three digit industries for 22 states. 
Dep. variable: Change 
in non-manual wage-bill 
share 
1984-89 1990-98  Pooled 1984-89 / 1990-98 
1990s indicator      0.0073 0.0066  0.0038  0.0044  0.0043 
     (.0010) (.0013)  (.0014)  (.0013)  (.0015) 
d Log capital/value 
added  0.0024  0.0343    0.0132  0.0024 0.0018 0.0045 
  (.0079) (.0067)    (.0060) (.0079)  (.0079)  (.0072) 
d Log capital/value 
added x 1990s         0.0320 0.0278 0.0250 
         (.0104) (.0104) (.0101) 
d Log value added  -0.0001  0.0283    0.0111 -0.0001  -0.0002  0.0044 
  (.0088) (.0084)    (.0065) (.0088)  (.0081)  (.0081) 
d Log value added 
 x 1990s         0.0284 0.0219 0.0240 
         (.0121) (.0104) (.0120) 
Constant  -0.0043  -0.0005  -0.0042 -0.0048  -0.0043  -0.0042  -0.0046 
  (.0009) (.0011)  (.0008)  (.0009)  (.0009) (.0008)  (.0008) 
State effects            X   
Industry effects              X 
R
2  0.001 0.10 0.14  0.15 0.17  0.21  0.24 
Observations  453 495  948  948  948 948  948 
Note: Figures are annualized changes for 3-digit manufacturing (ISIC) industries in twenty one state groups. 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 5% level 
are in bold face. Regressions estimated by weighted least squares with wage-bill shares averaged over the period 
as weights. See equation (4) in text. 
 
Table 7 reports sharper estimates using the richer dataset available by using variation 
across both states and industries.  The results are qualitatively the same as those in Table 6: 
capital-skill complementarity is much stronger in the 1990s after the reforms, the coefficient 
increasing by an order of magnitude, from 0.0024 to 0.0343.  The two rightmost columns report   24
that this increase in the capital-skill complementarity coefficient (0.0320 or 0.0278, depending on 
specification) is large and statistically significant.  As in Table 6 very little of the acceleration in 
skill upgrading is explained by capital-skill complementarity – the inclusion of a K/Y term which 
varies over time reduces the coefficient on the 1990s only slightly, from 0.0073 to 0.0068. 
 
Tests of Robustness 
We carried out a number of robustness checks on these share equation estimates. Sensitive to the 
idea that states may have very different experiences, one test is to run the same regression 
allowing each state a secular trend in the non-manual wage-bill share, perhaps to allow for local 
changes in trade, infrastructure investment, regulation, business cycles or technological change.  
Allowing for state fixed effects in growth hardly changes the estimated coefficients, as shown in 
the rightmost column of Table 7.  The 1990s increase in the capital-skill complementarity and 
output coefficients is reduced only slightly by allowing for state effects.  Surprisingly, allowing 
states a separate trend in changing wage-bill shares of non-manual workers increases the R
2 by 
only four percentage points.  
Table 8 reports tests of robustness to alternative sampling methods.  Recall that we split 
the sample in an unusual way to avoid the 1989-90 industry recoding and that we had some 
doubts about observations in the early period from West Bengal.  Table 8 reports estimated share 
equations using two different definitions of the periods and excluding West Bengal.  We try three 
approaches:  a) redefining the periods as 1984-90 and 1990-98, spanning the industry recoding of 
1989-90; b) redefining the periods as 1984-91 and 1991-98 to reflect the pre- and post-reform 
periods; and c) omitting West Bengal data altogether and using the period definitions 1984-89 
and 1990-98 as in the previous tables.  Increased capital-skill complementarity is evident in all   25
these estimates and is statistically significant in 5 of the 6 specifications.  As such, the finding of 
increased capital-skill complementarity in the 1990s is robust to different redefinitions of the 
sample. 
Table 8: Robustness Tests 
National Level  State Level 
Dependent variable: 


















1990s indicator  0.0009 0.0017  0.0032  0.0015 0.0014 0.0036 
  (.0016) (.0017)  (.0015)  (.0015) (.0013) (.0016) 
d Log capital/value added  -0.0212 0.0035  -0.0067 -0.0153 -0.0088 0.0015 
  (.0173) (.0149)  (.0157)  (.0091) (.0079) (.0087) 
d Log capital/value added x   0.0475  0.0192  0.0400  0.0496 0.0327 0.0331 
1990s  (.0202) (.0185)  (.0198)  (.0113) (.0097) (.0112) 
d Log value added  -0.0098  -0.0182 0.0056 -0.0017  -0.0165  -0.0003 
  (.0139) (.0122)  (.0117)  (.0095) (.0068) (.0090) 
d Log value added x 1990s  0.0395 0.0457  0.0267  0.0300 0.0484 0.0297 
  (.0171) (.0161)  (.0155)  (.0127) (.0097) (.0126) 
Constant  -0.0016 -0.0014  -0.0042 -0.0020  -0.0014  -0.0041 
  (.0010) (.0009)  (.0010)  (.0009) (.0008) (.0010) 
R
2  0.21 0.31  0.36  0.12 0.17 0.17 
Observations  152 156  151  947 949 896 
 
Note: Annualized changes for 76 four-digit manufacturing industries for all of India in each period in columns 1-3 
and for three-digit manufacturing industries in twenty two state groups in columns 4-6. Heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors in parentheses. Estimated by weighted least squares with wage-bill shares averaged over the period as 
weights. Coefficients significant at the 5% level in bold face.  See equation (4) in text. 
 
These different robustness tests together argue strongly for a clear conclusion:  Increased 
demand for non-manual workers in Indian manufacturing in the 1990s can be largely attributed to 
the combination of three factors:  increased capital-skill complementarity, increased investment   26
and increased output.  The first two are consistent with the idea of skill-biased technological 
change embodied in new investment yet they account for only a small fraction of the acceleration 
in skill-upgrading between the 1980s and 1990s.  The increase in output alone predicts almost 
half of that acceleration, which is really a surprise.  Fast growing industries are upgrading their 
skill mix faster than slow-growing or stable industries. 
To put the estimated capital-skill complementarity coefficients in context, compare them 
with U.S. estimates.  For U.S. manufacturing the comparable capital-skill complementarity 
coefficient (estimated in a similar regression) in 1959-86 is 0.038 (see Berman, Bound and 
Griliches, 1994), and for the 1979-86 period is 0.064.  Thus, these estimates indicate that capital-
skill complementarity in Indian manufacturing increased from an estimated zero in the 1980s to a 
level in the 1990s comparable to the U.S. level for the 1960s and 1970s. We interpret this as 
evidence of skill-biased technological change for technology embodied in new capital.  
Is increased capital-skill complementarity in Indian manufacturing related to the pattern 
of skill-biased technological change evident in the manufacturing sectors of OECD and middle 
income countries?  One way to look at this is to ask whether the same industries upgrade skills in 
different countries at the same time.  This cross-country correlation approach has shown 
consistent patterns of skill upgrading in many industries across countries in the OECD in the 
1980s (Berman, Bound and Machin, 1998).  Those same industries generally underwent skill-
upgrading in middle-income countries in the 1980s as well (Berman and Machin, 2000). 
Table 9 reports the result of a similar exercise for our Indian data, in which we ask if skill 
upgrading in Indian industries in the 1990s is predicted by upgrading in the same industries in 
previous decades in the U.S., after accounting for the effects of capital-skill complementarity and 
increased output.   
   27
Table 9: Estimated Wage-bill Share Equations allowing Cross-Country Correlations 
State  Manufacturing  1990-98 using three digit industries for 22 states. 
Dep. variable: Change in 
non-manual wagebill share  1990-98 
d Log capital/value added  0.0343  0.0343  0.0339 0.0338 0.0342 
  (.0067)  (.0067)  (.0067) (.0068) (.0066) 
d Log value added  0.0285  0.0284  0.0282 0.0281 0.0285 
  (.0084)  (.0084)  (.0084) (.0085) (.0083) 
d non-manual wage-bill 
share for US in 1960s  0.130    
 
 
  (.243)       
d non-manual wage-bill 
share for US in 1970s    0.104   
 
 
    (.208)     
d non-manual wage-bill 






d non-manual wagebill share 
for middle income in 1970s 
d non-manual wagebill share 
for middle income in 1980s 















Constant  0.0007  -0.0007  -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0002 
  (.0011)  (.0011)  (.0014) (.0012) (.0014) 
R
2  0.10  0.10  0.10 0.10 0.11 
Observations  495  495  495 495 495 
 
Note: Figures are annualized changes for three-digit manufacturing industries in twenty two state groups. 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors reported in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 5% level are 
in bold face. Regressions estimated by weighted least squares with wage-bill shares averaged over the period as 
weights. See equation (4) in text. 
 
The answer is negative.  There is only weak evidence of a correlation with U.S. skill 
upgrading in the same industries in the 1960s and 1970s and a weak negative correlation with the 
U.S. pattern in the 1980s.  Interestingly enough, the Indian pattern of skill upgrading in the 1990s 
is also not strikingly similar to that in middle-income countries either, showing a weak positive   28
correlation with the middle-income pattern for the 1980s and a negative correlation with the 
middle income pattern of skill-upgrading for the 1970s.  Thus, in contrast to middle-income 
countries, India’s participation in an international pattern of skill-biased technological change 
seems to be limited to technologies embodied in capital or somehow related to increased output. 
 
Table 10: Estimated Wage-bill Share Equations – State and Industry Effects 
State  Manufacturing  1990-98 using three digit industries for 22 states. 
 
Dependent variable: 
Change in non-manual 
wage-bill share 
1990-98 
d Log capital/value added  0.0343 0.0328  0.0324 
 (.0067)  (.0078)  (.0067) 
d Log value added  0.0283 0.0268  0.0184 
 (.0084)  (.0092)  (.0069) 
Constant  -0.0005 -0.0003  0.0006 
  (.0011) (.0012)  (.0009) 
       
28 industry effects    X   
20 state effects    X 
R
2  0.10 0.16  0.27 
Observations  495 495  495 
 
Note: Figures are annualized changes for three-digit manufacturing industries in twenty two state groups. 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 5% level 
are in bold face. Regressions estimated by weighted least squares with wage-bill shares averaged over the period 
as weights. See equation (4) in text. 
 
 
One remarkable feature of skill-upgrading in India is the different experiences across 
states in the 1990s.  Even among the states with large manufacturing sectors, the growth in wage-
bill share of  skilled workers ranges from a high of 0.89 percentage points a year in Gujarat to a 
low of –0.07 percentage points per year in West Bengal (as reported in Table 4).  Table 10 reports 
that this heterogeneity in skill upgrading across states remains evident when covariates are   29
included in estimating the share equation.  While including state effects in the regression has little 
effect on the estimated coefficients it does increase the R
2 quite a bit, from 0.10 to 0.27. This is 
interesting in the context of recent work which relates productivity growth in the post-
liberalization period to state-level regulations (Aghion et al., 2003). We tried replicating those 
results by checking if changes in state-level labor regulations in the late 1980s predicted skill 
upgrading in the 1990s using measures from Besley and Burgess (2002).
22 The answer is 
negative. Skill-upgrading in India was not restricted to a few states which followed particular 
policies. It appears to be a more a general phenomenon. 
In unreported results we have attempted to investigate the effects of one state-specific 
factor: electricity generated within the state. That variable also has no explanatory power.   
Further exploration of skill-upgrading in India may do well to focus on state-specific factors such 
as differences in infrastructure investment and regulation,
23 and in employment protection 




Indian manufacturing was unusual in the 1980s in the falling proportion of non-manual (relatively 
skilled) workers in employment, bucking a worldwide trend which has been associated with skill-
biased technological change.  The 1990s were different, though. The proportion of non-manual 
workers in employment increased, as did the non-manual share of the wage-bill.  All this took 
place against the backdrop of various economic reforms instituted in the early 1990s, and 
acceleration of investment and productivity. 
Is the increased use of skilled workers in Indian manufacturing in the 1990s due to SBTC? 
The answer is uncertain.  On the one hand, most of the skill upgrading occurred within 4 digit   30
industries (using the ISI classification), indicating that it was largely not due to shifts from low to 
high skill industries as would be the case if trade patterns or preferences for goods had changed. 
Furthermore, estimated capital-skill complementarity increased significantly between the 1980s 
and 1990s from about zero, to a level similar to that for U.S. manufacturing in the 1960s or 
1970s. This could well be due to skill-biased change in technologies embodied in capital.  
On the other hand, the combination of increased capital-skill complementarity and 
increased investment account for very little of measured skill-upgrading, assuming constant 
returns to scale. The only variable that consistently predicts skill upgrading in Indian industries is 
increased output.  Why growing output predicts skill upgrading is a mystery for future research. 
We can speculate, though.  One possibility is that restrictions on layoffs reduce the ability of 
firms to adjust their skill mix to make it appropriate for new technologies.  Rapidly growing firms 
can raise the proportion of skilled workers by hiring them disproportionately while firms with 
stable employment may not do so.  That constrained labor demand explanation is consistent with 
the pattern shown by U.S. manufacturing in the recession of the early 1980s, when firms freed of 
the usual firing constraints by the crisis laid off less-skilled workers disproportionately while new 
hires in the recovery were on average more skilled. 
Another reason to doubt that SBTC is a major influence is that the industries undergoing 
skill-upgrading are not the typical suspects revealed by cross country correlations in the literature. 
Data on investments in technology would help us understand why demand for skills has increased 
in some industries and not in others. This would be a particularly interesting investigation in India 
as tariffs on computers were reduced sharply in the early 1990s. 
  An important topic for future research is the high cross-state variation in increased 
demand for skills in registered manufacturing. Among the states with large manufacturing   31
sectors, the rapid increase in demand for skills in Haryana, Karnataka and Punjab in particular is 
not well explained by their industrial composition, capital-skill complementarity or the increased 
output effect.   32
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details). 
10 See Berman (2000) for a more detailed derivation. 














, or in the Cobb-Douglas case to the 
exponent of S growing at a faster rate than the exponent of L. 
12 We follow the standard practice in this literature of using the term “skill” to loosely refer to human capital 
accumulated through education.  A craftsman with low education in manufacturing would be an “unskilled” worker 
in this analysis. 
13  For example, Berman and Machin (2000) provide a summary of studies from the US and UK. 
14 Sanchez-Paramo and Schady (2002) confirm the same finding for six Latin American countries (Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico). 
15 For studies on the links between trade liberalization and relative wages, see Lawrence and Slaughter (1993), 
Robbins (1995), and Hanson and Harrison (1995). 
16 NIC is the National Industrial Classification used in India. 
17 We adjusted the pre-1990 data (based on NIC-70) to reflect the adoption in 1990 of a new industrial classification 
system (NIC-87).  This involved developing and applying a cross-walk between NIC-70 and NIC-87 to 
accommodate the industries that were either merged, split up, or mixed (both merged and split).The NIC70-NIC87 
cross-walk is available upon request from the authors. 
18 NIC code 335 corresponds to ISIC code 3720, which is classified as non-ferrous metal basic industries. 
19  Sources: Table 4.2 in Statistical Appendix to Economic Review 1990-91 of Government of West Bengal. The 
Table in turn cites the following: National Employment Service, West Bengal, and Bureau of Applied Economics, 
Bengal; Table 11.5 in West Bengal Statistical Handbook 1997 of Bureau of Applied Economics and Statistics, 
Government of West Bengal. The Table itself uses as source the Directorate of Cottage and Small Scale Industries, 
West Bengal; Chief Inspector of Factories, West Bengal. We thank Professor Dilip Mookherjee of Boston 
University for generously pursuing this investigation. 
20  These figures differ slightly from those in Table 2 as we have restricted the sample to observations in which all 
the covariates are present. 
21 Three-digit NIC translates into four-digit ISIC. 
22 We thank a referee for suggesting this to us. 
23 The Investment Climate, varying across Indian states, may also be a contributing factor for these differences 
24 For example, see Besley and Burgess (2002) on the role of cross-state differences in employment protection 
legislation on variations in economic growth across states in India. 